The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II
Sean Chick
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I made my name so to speak on BGG by writing historical geeklists. However, I feel the time has come to move onto to other activities. Still, there are some topics I wish to write about that, I'll probably never publish in a professional or popular way. So I'll publish them here.
Over this year I'll be publishing a series of geeklists. My first two will cover two military organizations that failed, and have fascinated me for years. The first one I offer you is the Imperial Japanese Navy, a fearsome force that entered World War II as masters of the seas, only to lose everything. Few nations have lost such a massive fleet in such a short amount of time. Even fewer have seen such a cataclysmic fall.
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Sean Chick
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Origins of a Fleet
Japan has a long naval tradition, tied to her position as an island nation that relied upon her generous fisheries. Her pirates were legendary in their day, and before 1640 Japanese nobles and shoguns kept large fleets that incorporated both western and eastern ideas. Japan itself oscillated between mainland contact and isolation, but the later was never as total as one might expect. Even after the expulsion of European contacts starting in 1640, which included the end of her fleet, the Dutch were still allowed to remain at Dejima. The result was that the Japanese avoided European penetration while still having knowledge of Europe's great leap forward in science and technology. By the 1840s Japan was once again building a war fleet. Then came Commodore Matthew Perry, who's steamships overawed the Japanese and forced them to sigh a trade contract with America. The shock was sudden and complete. Japan's rulers now sought to avoid the fate of every other Asian country outside of Thailand: European supremacy. A great modernization program began, including the construction of a navy. At first the Japanese drew assistance from the Dutch.
In 1868 the Meiji restoration was all but complete, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) came into formal existence in 1869. It was at this time a small and struggling force, but the Japanese sought to emulate the finest navy in the world: Britain. Dutch and French assistance were turned down, and the British supported Japanese naval development with experts and some meager resources. Although mainly a coastal defense force, the IJN intervened in local affairs in Korea and Taiwan. However, the army, modeling itself on the recently victorious Prussians, received the lion share's of resources. Also, relations with Britain strained over Japanese ambitions in China, and in the 1880s the IJN favored French doctrine and assistance, which emphasized faster warships. Even the legendary ship designer Emile Bertin offered direct assistance. This led to a Japanese emphasis upon torpedoes. The first test of the IJN came in the Sino-Japanese War, which saw the navy destroy its Chinese counterpart at the Yalu River. However, it also showed the weakness of Japan's French influence, and the need for larger and more powerful warships. The Japanese returned to using British expertise, the result being that by 1904 Japan had a large fleet that combined the best of both the French and British schools.
The Russo-Japanese War started with a surprise attack upon Port Arthur, Russia's Pacific naval base. The battle was a clear Japanese victory, and shocked a world where European superiority was not merely a given, but appeared to be ordained by god, nature, and empire. Tsar Nicholas II now sent a large fleet to intervene while shipping more soldiers east. By 1905 the Japanese army had triumphed in brutal fighting, culminating at Mukden. Soon after, at the straits of Tsushima, the Russian fleet was destroyed. The victory was as decisive as it was lopsided. It was the triumph of a mixed doctrine, as Japan's advantage in both smaller torpedo attack ships and battleships with large batteries won the day. Japan was now an empire to be feared. Yet the myth of European superiority would live on, with disastrous consequences in 1941.
The Battle of Tsushima
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Sean Chick
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Lead up to War
The effects of Tsushima cannot be overstated. The battle gave Japan an Asian Empire and made her the leading power in the region. For the Japanese Navy, it granted them a level of prestige undreamed of. World War I only added to this prestige. At Tsingtao, Germany's premiere base in China, the IJN launched the first seaborne air attack in history. In addition her naval forces occupied the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, giving her navy valuable base in the Pacific Ocean. By 1917 her forces were escorting transports in the Mediterranean Sea. At low cost in men and material, Japan emerged with a larger empire in 1918. By 1921, the navy's budget was expanded, and plans were drawn up to construct battleships and aircraft carriers, which were far more powerful than similar French and British designs. Only America had proposed warships on par with the latest Japanese designs.
It was in relation to America that the influence of Tsushumia became an albatross. By 1922, both nations saw the other as a potential rival, and the Washington Naval Conference, which saw the Americans succeed in limiting Japanese naval power, only fanned these flames. Meanwhile, the navy's political power declined in relation to the army, as the naval high command was torn between hardliners and those who favored rapprochement with the west. The army was mostly united in its aggressive stance. When the Great Depression began the Japanese Army responded with a policy of conquest. By occupying Manchuria and then starting a war with China in 1937, they dragged Japan into a land war in Asia, that in spite of some spectacular land victories, had no end in sight.
The navy did well in the Chinese invasion, making air strikes and supporting amphibious landings. But it was the army's war to win or lose, and as the war dragged on, the army's desire for a land war in Asia looked less desirable. The final nail in the coffin came when the Red Army defeated the Japanese at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. Now the policy makers looked south, to the imperial possessions of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. With Japan threatening western interests, and allying itself to Germany and Italy in 1940, America took a hardline policy against Japan. The stage was set for war.
Mitsubishi A5M, the IJN's Main Fighter Before 1941
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Sean Chick
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The Fleet in 1941
On the eve of war Japan had the third largest fleet in the world, boasting 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, nearly 30 cruisers, and over 150 destroyers, as well as a fleet of large ocean going submarines. With the exception of the aircraft carriers and submarines, each of these ships showed the influence of Tsushima. The battleships were a mixed breed, and included the reconstructed battlecruisers of the Kongo class, as well as 4 World War I era dreadnoughts, 2 post World War I battleships, and the latest battleship design: Yamato. The older ships followed the Japanese practice of sacrificing armor for speed and firepower, although by 1941 these ships were slower and had less firepower than their contemporaries. Indeed, Japan's only fast battleships were the Kongo class, but their armor was a liability. In that sense, Yamato was actually a radical departure, since it boasted heavy armor, armaments, and somehow managed to have a respectable top speed of 27 knots.
In many ways the pride of the navy was invested in its cruisers and destroyers. The success of lighter warships at Tsushima caused the Japanese to emphasis light surface tactics, particularly night assaults. The destroyers that Japan produced in the 1920s were light-years ahead of contemporary designs, and not out-classed until later French and American designs were launched during the war. Japanese destroyers had surface guns capable of out-ranging other destroyers, and were further aided by the oxygen torpedo, known as the long lance. This weapon gave Japan an edge in surface battles that was needed due to their lack of radar.
While nearly all Japanese ships were fast and well armed, the lack of armor made them susceptible to damage. This was complicated by a lack of focus on damage control techniques. This resulted both in a tendency for warships to suffer crippling damage from relatively light wounds, and worst of all an inability to deal with even light damage. While British, Italian, and French ships also suffered from light armor, each navy had better damage control techniques. Also, few of the ships in these navies could match Japanese firepower. The result was that the average Japanese warship was a floating contradiction. They could dish out pain but not take it. The ships relied upon elite crews and yet the navy failed to train them to deal with the blows of battle or to design ships that protected men who it took years to train. The later point is arguably a function of a culture that put a high premium upon death and a government which, unlike the western democracies, did not respect life in the same way. The result for the average Japanese sailor was a life of intense hardship.
Battleships Yamashiro, Fusō, and Haruna
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Sean Chick
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Kido Butai
Of all the branches of Japan's navy, it was her aircraft carrier force, known as Kido Butai, that represented the conflicting virtues and vices of her navy. In many ways it was the most advanced carrier force in the world. Its pilots and commanders believed in aggressive strikes, and the use of task forces built around multiple carriers. Crews were trained to the highest efficiency, and the pilots saw themselves as Japan's elite. By 1941, Kido Butai was among the most potent attack forces in the world.
However, there were glaring weaknesses that became visible only in the fires of war, and often times too late. For thing, although Japan had six large aircraft carriers, these ships were rather vulnerable, and due to fuel shortage practices, prone to catch fire. While the pilots were elite, the aircraft were typically not of the best variety. The Aichi D3A carried a rather small bomb load and the Nakajima B5N was an old model even by 1941. Although the A6M was a remarkable fighter, it had poor armor protection. The result was that Japanese pilots took heavy losses as the war went on, but the Japanese aircraft industry could barely keep up and pilot training programs were not up to the task.
There was a greater weakness in play though. Although many of Japan's admirals had accepted the carrier, it did not follow that they fully understood its use. Chūichi Nagumo was chosen to lead Kido Butai, but he was wary about the new weapon's potential, and showed himself to be aggressive and cautious at any given moment. This ambivalence could also be seen in anti-aircraft defenses. When the war began, all of the navies had underestimated the number of anti-aircraft guns needed. Japan though, in spite of her aggressive use of aircraft and early war experiences, was even slower to upgrade. Sailors often had to soldier on with inferior guns. This weakness would haunt the Japanese throughout the war.
The Carrier Akagi
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5.
Board Game: IJN
[Average Rating:7.99 Unranked]
[Average Rating:7.99 Unranked]
Sean Chick
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The Men
The design and application of ships are all good and well, but the men must rate as the most important asset in any fleet. It was a lesson the Japanese seemed to take to heart and yet reject all at once, for the enlisted sailor was well drilled and mercilessly trained in his craft, yet he lived in ships that disregarded good living conditions and adequate armor. The result was a hard life made worse by draconian discipline. In the opening months there was no harm, and accounts prove that crew morale was high. By 1944 the men were cracking, and Japan's submarine force was actually avoiding battle at all costs, and therefore disregarding orders.
The harsh discipline, poor food, and deary living conditions extended to the junior officers as well. Trained in an environment no less unforgiving, Japanese officers were expected to be hard on their men, and also to follow orders rather rigidly. The result was a lack of creative thinking, which extended to the high command. Japanese obsessions with attack tactics, decisive battle, and complicated maneuvers led to a remarkably conservative core of admirals. What was worse, the Japanese did not always adequately train officers for radar and sonar duties, which caused grave problems as the war wore on. In addition, violence between admirals was not uncommon, with Nagumo himself being attacked by the aggressive Tamon Yamaguchi on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Yamaguchi was a microcosm of the navy's best and worst tendencies, for while aggressive and innovative, he was also steeped in Bushido, and surprisingly rigid in battle.
So it was that in 1941 the Japanese Navy entered the war with an elite, but strained force. The tough training regimen arguably wore out the officers, and certainly it created rigid thinking. None of this doomed Japan, for the men entered the war in high spirits, and proved to be worthy of their long tradition. However, such training and discipline made this officer class highly brittle. When I read about the sailors and officers of this doomed fleet, I am reminded of this line from Tao de Ching: "Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is fluid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong."
Officer on the Deck of the Carrier Shokaku, December 7, 1941
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Sean Chick
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Strategy
It was in terms of strategy that the Japanese Navy was at its weakest. Much of this had to do with rigidity. The navy's emphasis upon attack and surprise had been confirmed by the Russo-Japanese War. As a result, war plans usually called for several fleets operating at once, the intention being that this would confuse the enemy over objectives. The result was complicated plans carried out by fleets that could not support each other in the crucible of battle. This later point undermined Japanese naval plans because they often featured a decisive engage as the end result of operations. The Japanese Navy was enthralled by the memory of Tsushumia and obsessed with relieving the past on a strategic scale. This thinking led to a very poor use of submarines, which were used in fleet operations rather than striking at enemy supply lines.
The army's failures in China and against the Russians had increased the navy's leverage, but there was no consensus among the navy's top brass on what to do, in part because it was torn by bitter debates over Japan's aggressive diplomatic stance and the use of aircraft. The former was a product of the navy's cosmopolitan outlook, as many of its admirals saw war with the west as disastrous. This was made particularly bitter because violence was not uncommon in the higher circles of Japan. By 1940, Japan's alliance with the Axis Powers and invasion of Indochina led America to place an embargo on some imports and move the Pacific naval base from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In July 1941 America suspended its oil exports to Japan, giving the aggressive faction the ammunition it needed to force a decision in favor of war.
The Japanese Navy's default strategy was for the seizure of resource rich lands in the southwest Pacific, where British, Dutch, and Australian holdings were only sparsely defended. The question was over whether such a strategy would drag the Americans into the war. Here is where a rift between Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, which oversaw strategic planning and allocation, and Combined Fleet, grew into a bitter feud. Osami Nagano, the chief of staff, was paradoxically a firm supportor of war and empire, but convinced that war could be fought without American interference. Although his insights had merit, they were undermined by his lack of charisma and vision. Isoroku Yamamoto, was Nagano's opposite: cultured, charismatic, creative, and opposed to war, but convinced that if war came Japan must strike America first. Ultimately, Yamamoto won the debate through force of personality, and ordered the most daring operation in naval history: the attack on Pearl harbor.
Yammamoto and His Staff
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Sean Chick
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Pear Harbor
It is miraculous that the attack on Pearl harbor was even carried out. The army opposed it, but lacked the political will to stop it. Nagano's criticisms, while well thought out, came from a man who people increasingly did not respect. Nagumo, head of the main strike force of Kido Butai, was especially critical. Nagumo though was in a hard position. Although beloved by his men and thoroughly competent at fleet operations, he was critical of the use of aircraft and could be exceedingly gruff. His appointment had more to do with seniority and his friendship with Nagano, and he was rebuffed. The operation went forward, and the training for it was exacting and innovative. It helped that Minoru Genda, one of the world's top carrier experts, worked on the operation from start to finish.
After a long journey through the barren North Pacific, Nagumo was ready to launch his strike on December 7, 1941. The attack consisted of two waves, and the results for America were humiliating to say the least: 4 battleships were sunk along with 4 more damaged and 2 destroyers sunk. nearly 200 aircraft were destroyed, and worst of all around 3,600 men were killed or wounded. Not since the failed attack on Penobscot Bay in 1779 had the American Navy suffered such a lopsided defeat. The Japanese had lost only 29 aircraft in the process, considerable losses for a raid, but minuscule considering the damage wrought.
Since that "day of infamy" controversy has raged on both sides. For the Japanese, while a brilliant tactical victory, its strategic and operational success was debated even by the navy's high command in 1941. While fuel stocks, repair yards, and submarines were considered low priority targets, the Japanese eventually saw the error of not making these objectives. Yammamoto had hoped to catch the American carriers there, for he knew the battleships at Pearl Harbor were powerful but outdated vessels. Yammamoto used the victory to further undercut Nagano's authority, but privately he brooded over the war and became increasingly morose. Although made a hero in Japanese propaganda, he began to privately question even his decision to strike at Pearl Harbor. While he never said "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve" it sums up the results of the attack. Nevertheless, the attack on Pearl Harbor was, from a purely military standpoint, one of if not the most brilliant operations in naval history.
The Attack on Battleship Row
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Sean Chick
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The Fate of Empires
Pearl Harbor remains the most infamous part of Japan's grand offensive, but it was not the main effort, and strategically, it was only a side offensive. The main push came in the Southwest Pacific, and was spearheaded by the bulk of Japan's cruisers and destroyers, supported by 2 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier. At Pearl harbor, American forces had been taken by surprise. At the Philippines, Allied forces had hours notice, and they had been preparing for an invasion for months. Yet the Japanese managed to destroy the air force on the ground at Clark Field and land their troops unopposed. Much of this had to do with the incompetent American commander, Douglas MacArthur, who saw the Japanese as inferior and reportedly thought Pearl Harbor was carried out by German mercenaries. The small American surface fleet had to flee, and the American submarine flotilla was ineffective due to defective torpedoes.
Elesewhere the Japanese attacked isolated posts. Hong Kong fell after a short but sharp fight, Guam surrendered without much of a battle. Oil rich Burnei was taken in a matter of days, and Thailand was forced to support Japan, opening the way to Burma. At Wake Island the first Japanese attack was repulsed, but the island fell on the second try, making it the Alamo of the Pacific and United States Marine Corps legend. The most grievous blow came at Malaya. Here the British had sent several divisions, dozens of aircraft, and the modern battleship Prince of Wales along with the old battlecrusier Repulse. This was meant as a relatively cheap deterrent, since the British could ill afford to send a lavish number of troops.
Malaya and Singapore fell in a little over 2 months. Prince of Wales and Repulse, sailing without air cover, were sunk by attack planes, leaving no doubt that the airplane was the decisive weapon of naval warfare. It was not that battleships were easy targets or irrelevant, but rather they needed air cover to survive the new way of war. Just as that myth was dying, so was a far bigger one: European dominance. While the Japanese proved to be far more cruel and exploitative than the western powers, the victory of an Asiatic power over the western powers that preached a gospel of racial superiority, inspired colonial struggles throughout the world while destroying the old institutions of control. That the Japanese achieved this through spectacular and lop sided victories made the victories all the more exciting for a people used to subjugation. In that sense, the teetering edifice of nineteenth century imperialism was destroyed in the jungles of Malaya and on the beaches of the Philippines. Ironically, the Japanese, through conquest, were themselves attempting to emulate the very imperial model that they had shattered with their victories.
Postcard Celebrating the Sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse
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Sean Chick
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Java Sea and Indian Ocean
The fall of Malaya and the conquest of most of the Philippines was only first act in the Southern Operation. The next phase called for an attack on the Dutch East Indies, which was the brass ring of the "Southeast Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Sumatra was invaded on February 14, 1942, but the Allies had pieced together a ragtag fleet of Dutch, British, American, and Australian cruisers and destroyers that had to be defeated before Java could be seized. From February 4th to March 1st, the two fleets fought a series of desperate actions, which resulted in the almost total destruction of the Allied fleet at minimal cost to the Japanese. Although the Allies had labored under tremendous communications difficulties, the battle was an "ideal" surface action in that neither side had considerable air assets. The Japanese at Pearl Harbor and Malaya had proven to be masters in using aircraft. Now they had proven themselves to be adept in surface battles.
With the destruction of the Allied fleet the Japanese were free to invade Java, which fell rather quickly. At Timor Allied forces, in particularly the Australians, fought with zeal and held out until February 10, 1943. The situation though only got worse wen Kido Butai was sent to the Southwest with orders to destroy the British and Australian fleet and damage nearby port facilities in order to ensure that the Allies would be unable to strike at the Dutch East Indies. The first raid came at Darwin, Australia, which was hit by some 242 aircraft. Although only 1 destroyer was sunk along with a few transport ships and 22 aircraft, the destruction of the port facilities forced the Allies to abandon the port and any plans of striking the Dutch East Indies in 1942. Combined with some land based raids, including a daring strike on Broome, the Japanese had secured their defensive perimeter at only a small cost in planes and lives. The bigger test would come in the Indian Ocean, where the British had rushed 5 battleships and 3 aircraft carriers in a desperate attempt to stem the tide. With the invasion of Andaman Islands and Burma underway, Yamamoto rightfully feared that the Royal Navy might launch a counterattack.
Kido Butai entered the Indian Ocean in March 1942 and raided several port facilities while managing to sink 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 2 destroyers. Both the Japanese and British tried to find each other's main battle forces, but failed, making the Indian Ocean raid appear to be indecisive. Certainly the Japanese wanted a bigger victory. However, the effects of this battle were decisive in the strategic sense. The Japanese had proven that they could move about the Indian Ocean at will, while the shipping and aircraft losses were considerable enough to force the British to withdraw their naval forces to East Africa. With Japanese attentions turned elsewhere, the Royal Navy was free to send its forces back to Europe, but the quick and lop-sided Japanese victories on both land and sea made the British pathologically afraid of Japan until the victory at Imphal in 1944. For the IJN, the Indian Ocean raid was a major psychological triumph. The Royal Navy had been their mentor in decades passed, and the Indian Ocean raid cemented the supremacy of the student over the master.
Hermes Sinks After Being Attacked by Nearly 100 Aircraft
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Sean Chick
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Coral Sea
With the fall of the Dutch East Indies and the withdrawal of the Royal Navy, IJN now had to face the American fleet, which had launched a series of small carrier raids through the opening months of the war. Then on April 18, 1942 the Americans launched the daring Doolittle Raid on Tokyo using B-25 bombers. Damage from the raid was light, but the psychological damage was considerable. At this point the IJN approved three operations. Two were set for June 1942, and would involve the seizure of Midway and part of the Aleutian Islands, while operations against Australia were proposed. IJN considered an outright invasion, but the army argued that it lacked the manpower to accomplish such a task and a more realistic compromise solution was reached. Operation MO, which would feature a landing at Port Moresby, New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands, was intended as the first phase in a plan top cut communications between Australia and America. Rather than hoarding their forces for 1-2 operations, the IJN would try to accomplish all 3 within a 1 month period of time.
The fleets used for Operation MO were composed of light warships, supported by two large aircraft carriers and one light carrier. The Japanese expected light resistance. However, the Communication Security Section of the Office of Naval Communications had cracked the IJN's codes and was able to send two large fleet carriers to the Coral Sea. If not for the Doolittle Raid, more would have been there. On May 3 the Americans attacked the Solomon Islands invasion force, sinking one destroyer and alerting the Japanese fleet. In the next few days a confused battle erupted. Both sides were still new to carrier operations, and their experience mostly involved attacking bases, not mobile fleets. Such was the confusion that on one occasion Japanese aircraft tried to land on the Yorktown. When the smoke cleared the Japanese had lost the light carrier Shoho and the carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged. The Americans had lost the carrier Lexington, but the IJN canceled the operation. It was the first major Allied victory in the Pacific Ocean.
The implications of the Battle of the Coral Sea cannot be overstated. For one it was the first naval battle that did not feature a surface action, making it a revolutionary moment in the history of warfare. While both sides lost heavily, the Japanese could ill afford such losses. Due to damage, Shokaku could not be sent to Midway, and Zuikaku's air wing had been decimated. Meanwhile the army's landward attack on Port Moresby came to naught. Operation MO was not a decisive Allied victory. Japan could still carry out their long-term objectives and islands in the Solomons had been seized. But the first defeat should have served as a warning. It did not, and while Zuikaku languished at Truk, Yorktown, the plucky survivor of Coral Sea, was steaming to Midway.
An Attack Group on the Deck of the Shokaku
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Sean Chick
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Midway
Just as at Coral Sea, the Americans knew the Japanese were going to strike at Midway, a small spec of land in the vast Pacific Ocean. For this operation the IJN assembled the largest fleet Japan had ever wielded: over 100 warships. Trouble was both the Midway and Aleutians invasions were set to occur at once, so at Midway IJN would only have 4 large aircraft carriers. The objective was to take Midway and bait the American fleet into a repeat of Tsushima. In this way the carriers would act as the hammer, and IJN's battleship fleet as the anvil. While perhaps not a bad idea in theory, the Midway operation supposed that the Americans would act in a certain way. Furthermore, the planning was rushed, with Yamamoto failing to provide the inspired leadership that he had shown in 1941. Also, Midway was an almost useless plot of land.
Luck did not hold up at Midway. Japanese submarines were only a few hours shy of sighting the American carriers and warning Nagumo. The first Japanese strike on Midway was unsuccessful and the search for nearby American ships was poorly handled. Then came the American air attacks. The first few waves were easily defeated, but they confused Nagumo, delayed counterstrikes, and left the fighter patrol disorganized and low on ammunition. Then at 10:22am American dive bombers struck at the perfect time, as the carriers were preparing planes for a strike, and therefore had ammunition and gasoline on deck. Five minutes later three carriers were burning. Rather than retreating, Hiryu launched counter-strikes at Yorktown, only to take fatal damage in the afternoon. By the next day fresh American attacks and the loss of all four large carriers compelled Yamamoto to turn back to Japan. Only the loss of Yorktown to a submarine added any sort of revenge.
It has become fashionable to say that Midway was not decisive, and hardly a miracle. On the later point I challenge anyone to find a battle where 3 capital ships received fatal damage in less than 5 minutes. Midway was where luck met preparation, and like any disaster, their are many reasons for it and to take away any one of them (poor Japanese Air defenses, cracked codes, poor Japanese carrier design, etc.) is to negate the decisive effects. Midway was decisive in that Japan could never again launch major offensive operations, her carrier forces never recovered, and the initiative now passed to the Americans. Yet in one sense Midway might have been the battle that helped Japan more than America. In December 1941 America had pledged to put roughly 90% of it resources into the war in Europe. Following Japan's lighting victories, some were questioning this wisdom, and Ernest J. King, commander of the American fleet, was prepared to lobby for a shift of resources to fighting Japan. Midway ensured that America would, until 1944, make the Pacific a secondary theater. Nevertheless, two events had occurred concurrent to Midway, each with dire consequences. At the same time Kaga was burning up, a zero had been captured in the raid on Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians. This zero allowed the Americans to learn the weaknesses of an aircraft that had so far ruled the skies. The second was the the Japanese had landed troops on Guadalcanal, with the mission of building an airbase at the southernmost tip of their empire. This alerted the Americans, who after Midway, were ready to counterattack.
Hiryu Dodges a Bomber Attack
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Guadalcanal
After some bitter debates between the army and navy, the US began the long road to Tokyo by attacking Guadalcanal with naval and marine forces. The island was quickly seized and an airbase dubbed Henderson Field was made operational. Local Japanese air and naval forces reacted swiftly to the landings. The Americans, arrogant after their victory at Midway, were taken by surprise at Savo Island and suffered heavy losses. Meanwhile, the IJN's high command slowly reacted to the new threat. In the wake of Midway the admirals had rallied around each other, to avoid losing face to the army. As a result, no one was relieved for that defeat. The other result as a general stunned lethargy that fell over Nagano and Yamamoto. Now, forced to awaken, the navy reacted by shifting forces from Japan to Truk and Rabaul, two major bases near the Solomons.
A series of hotly contested battles were fought in August, September, and October. In the air above Guadalcanal aircraft fought for dominance, while Japanese land forces attempted to turn the tide. At sea, a series of fierce carrier and surface battles were fought. At the Eastern Solomons the Americans won a costly carrier victory, while off Cape Esperance America's surface forces got some revenge for Savo Island. Off the Santa Cruz islands the Japanese made a bold strike, leading to a hotly contested carrier duel which left both sides diminished. It was now up to the surface fleets to decide the fate of Guadalcanal.
From November 13-15 the fiercest naval battle of the Second World War was fought. The first encounter was a night action that left both sides stunned. American aircraft were operational in spite of a prolonged bombardment of Henderson Field, and American aircraft ravaged a large troop reinforcement convoy. The final naval battle ended in another costly American victory, but the results were clear. Japan had lost Guadalcanal. A grave pall feel on the IJN. The losses had been heavily, but worst of all the defeat now seemed inevitable. Japanese logistics were simply not up to the task, for even though the IJN had more warships on hand, it could not fuel the ships for operations, while Americans held the skies. Outside of the battles at Savo Island and a meaningless last ditch victory at Tassafaronga, the Americans had come out ahead in each battle. In January the IJN launched Operation Ke, the withdrawal of troops from Guadalcanal. American strategic mistakes and a defeat off Rennell Island made the operation a success, even if it was the same as admitting defeat. The worst was yet to come.
Destroyed Japanese Transport at Guadalcanal
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The Killing Time
Having failed to achieve a victory at Guadalcanal, the Japanese navy settled in for a strategy of using minor surface forces and aircraft to stem the tide, while coincidentally the American navy shied away from committing capital ships. With the final conquest of Guadalcanal complete on February 9, 1943, the Americans turned north. So began a long grinding campaign of dogfights and skirmishes that gradually wore down the Japanese. Some of restraint on the part of both sides had to do with the heavy losses of 1942. While Japanese logistics were straining to a breaking point, American supplies were limited because the war in Europe US soldiers were at long last fighting the Germans in large field battles. Called Operation Cartwheel, the Allies settled for a slow advance up the Solomons and New Guinea. Neither side had many ships available and the Americans were forced to ask the Royal Navy for assistance.
In March 1943 this new way of war was touched off when 6 Japanese destroyers sank at Blackett Strait and in the Bismarck Sea. The former showed that American surface ships were becoming adept at night fighting. The later was achieved in a massive air strike that shredded a convoy, showing Japan's weakening hold over the skies. A further three destroyers were lost to mines. In response, Yamamoto ordered Operation I-Go, a massed aerial attack launched from Japanese bases. The results were heavy losses and a few ships sunk. Yamamoto, happy with the hollow victory, came to inspect his forward bases, in part to show his courage since some grumbled that he had grown soft by being in the rear. Instead, his route was discovered, and at the orders of Franklin Roosevelt, his aircraft was intercepted and destroyed. Yamamoto was dead. His replacement, Mineichi Koga, had his predecessors' foibles but none of his strengths. He was more hidebound than Yamamoto and his only combat command had been overseeing the invasion of Hong Kong in 1941. While he planned grand aggressive operations, the navy continued to bleed away in the Solomons.
At Kula Gulf and Kolombangara in July 1943 the Japanese won small victories, only to suffer grievously at Vella Gulf the following month. The Allied advance did not stop though, and soon New Georgia and Vella Lavella were poised to fall. Meanwhile, Koga reorganized Japan's carriers, basing them upon new American organizational doctrine, while trying to improve the land based air squadrons with transfers from the carriers, diluting the strength of the later. In May of 1943 the Americans had retaken Attu in the Aleutian Islands and Koga tried to mount an aggressive counteroffensive in the Aleutians. Developments to the south though forced Koga to redeploy his forces and energies, but by then it was too late.
Japanese Prisoners from the Cruiser Jintsu
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Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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The Point of No Return
After Guadalcanal, Japan's slim hopes of victory faded. Yet the apocalypse that would follow was by no means ordained, and yet as 1943 became 1944, it was clear that the Imperial Japanese Navy was headed to complete destruction. At Vella Lavella on October 6, 1943 the Japanese navy won its last victory. From here on out it was only defeat. The American navy had by now learned their trade. They knew how to combat Japan's night fighting tactics, could use their radar with skill, and had promoted a host of fighting admirals to high command. In addition, American carrier forces were now clearly superior to the Japanese in aircraft and pilot quality. As Allied forces invaded Bougainville, a large Japanese fleet tried to stop them at Empress Augusta Bay. It was the first time Americans completely dominated the Japanese in an evenly matched surface battle. A few days later Rabual was attacked by aircraft. The base was now vulnerable and ships were being sent north to Truk. Before the retreat was over, a "Tokyo Express" run of troops to Bougainville was intercepted at Cape St. George. In another straight up fight, the Japanese were smashed. The Solomon Islands were abandoned. The effect of the grueling campaign cannot be overstated. Japan no longer had enough escorts to shield its remaining carriers, and guard convoys against submarine attacks, and retain sufficient strength to engage in surface battles. This deficiency was matched by other calamities.
To combat the landings at Bougainville, Koga ordered Operation RO, a massed air attack against the American forces. In eight days of fighting over 200 Japanese aircraft were lost. Koga was almost relieved, and the carriers fell back to Japan to lick their wounds and retrain new pilots. Jisaburō Ozawa, who had replaced Nagumo in November 1942, now advised that Truk should be abandoned. Koga, was slow to do so. Then in December 1943 came the greatest shock of all: the attack on the Gilbert Islands. The ability of the Americans to bring such an armada of ships to bear across the expanse of the central Pacific shocked the Japanese. Koga could react with nothing save a few submarines, most of which were destroyed. This was a shock as well, since Japanese submarines had achieved some impressive results in 1942. For the first time ever the Japanese could do nothing as the Americans penetrated their defensive perimeter. While plans were drawn up to reorganize the fleet and change strategy, Truk was assaulted in a massive air raid that all but destroyed the base. At the cost of 25 aircraft and two slightly damaged warships, the Americans sank 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 8 auxiliaries, 32 transports, and destroyed 270 aircraft. Not even a powerful base like Truk could resit the revitalized American navy.
Something else was occurring too. American submarines had begun the war with much promise, only to fail in 1942 due to inferior torpedoes. It was not that the crews were of low quality. Submarine skippers were expected to be aggressive, and they could achieve success, as shown when the destroyer Yamakaze was sunk on June 25, 1942, off the coast of Japan. It was not until the fall of 1943 that torpedo problems were fixed and crew training was up to snuff. Now Nimitz, himself a former submarine commander, launched his "silent service" on a campaign to destroy Japanese shipping. With the severe losses in escorts, Japan had few ships guarding their convoys, while Japanese SONAR was inferior and anti-submarine tactics were lacking. Just as Truk was being destroyed, Japan's logistics were coming apart.
The Destroyer Yamakaze Takes the Final Plunge
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Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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Philippine Sea
Koga now drew up plans for a Tsushima styled decisive engagement as he withdrew his forces closer to Japan's logistical base in Burnei, allowing him to deploy heavy units with greater ease. The plan called for massing the fleet at any of the points where the Americans may attack: Biak, the Philippines, Palau, and the Mariana Islands. Palau was the preferred target, but Koga believed it would come in the Philippines and he massed his forces accordingly. The plan also called for moving thousands of aircraft to the front-lines in several bases, although pilot training time had to be reduced. Koga, while moving his headquarters from Palau to Davao, was killed on March 31 when his plane crashed during a typhoon. His death was not announced until May 1944 when he was formally replaced by Admiral Soemu Toyoda, a taciturn man who had strongly opposed the war. His only combat experience was overseeing naval operations in the opening phase of the war with China. He was also despised by the army, and openly stated that army officers were morons. Toyoda chose to continue Koga's strategy.
On May 27, Biak was attacked. The island's defenders savaged the Americans, who were not used to advanced defensive tactics. Meanwhile, Toyoda put his forces in motion. As the Japanese approached though, the main American attack fell upon the Mariana Islands. Toyoda, in one of the war's great blunders, ordered his forces north to seek out Tsushima rather than fall upon and possibly crush a smaller force. Ozawa, commanding the attack, wisely decided to use the greater range of his aircraft to strike from afar. In a series of massive attacks Ozawa lost some 243 aircraft, while the land based forces were shredded. American losses consisted of only 23 airplanes. Submarines then torpedoed and sank the big carriers Shokaku and Taiho. The next day the Americans made a desperate carrier attack that sank more ships, although night-time aircarft landings resulted in heavy losses. Japan's carrier forces were broken, and the battle was dubbed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." The last of the carrier battles was a more lopsided defeat than Midway.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea had major repercussions. The islands gave America bases to bomb Japan and invade the islands that ringed Nippon. Nagano, by now a mere figurehead, was removed, and Japan cycled through several other Imperial Japanese Naval General Staff commanders. The result was that Toyoda kept his job and was more firmly in control than ever. This tumult was matched by political fallout, since unlike Midway, the details of the defeat were leaked to the public. Hideki Tojo was removed as Prime Minister and in the upper echelons of command there was open talk of imminent defeat. Still, there was hope that a negotiated peace could be achieved, which Toyoda firmly believed was possible. This was partially inflated by overly enthusiastic battle reports. While both sides had a tendency to inflate losses, the Japanese were particularly bad about this. Partially it came from a culture that demanded success and punished failure, and therefore led to exaggerated victories in order to cover for defeat. Meanwhile the high command, desperate for good news, did not question these reports. Delusion had set in.
A Victim of the Philippine Sea
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Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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Leyte Gulf
In a rare moment of strategic insight, Toyoda and his staff ascertained that the next attack would come at the Philippines at Leyte Gulf. Although hopes of success were slim, Toyoda was somewhat buoyed by heavy American losses in the attack on Palau and also the results of the American attack on Formosa. Although the raid actually cost the Japanese some 500 aircraft, Toyoda chose to believe reports that several American warships had been sunk. When the landings came at Leyte, Toyoda ordered the fleet into action.
The Leyte operation was as complex as previous battle plans, and called for five fleets to coordinate. One fleet with carriers would try to draw the Americans north, while two small fleets of surface warships would try to force Surigao Strait. Although not informed of this, those fleets were meant as decoys as well, while a large strike fleet of battleships would enter Leyte Gulf and destroy the transports. Lastly, the smallest fleet would try to run supplies to Leyte in all the confusion. The operation got off to an inauspicious beginning when submarines attacked the main force, which then came under heavy air attack, resulting in the loss of the giant battleship Musashi and a temporary withdrawal.
Then, the plan started to work. Ozawa's carriers made a feeble strike and the Americans took the bait, sinking Ozawa's carriers, but leaving the invasion force exposed. At Surigao Strait the Japanese forces were all but destroyed, but the Americans had expended most of their anti-shipping ammunition. If the main fleet could get to Leyte, then a great strategic victory could be achieved. Yet it was all a chimera. The main force met some American destroyers and carriers, which made a desperate stand. Radar controlled gunfire and constant air attacks harried a fleet already on edge and Takeo Kurita, the commander of the fleet, chose to withdraw. Perhaps a victory was impossible even then, for American aircraft and radar were plentiful. Indeed, the future of warfare lay with these things, and not large battleships. Perhaps it was only right that the best success the Japanese had came from kamikaze attacks, in which young pilots rammed ships. This caused great damage while it put few demands on Japan's inexperienced pilots. As for the fleet, the engagement ended the Japanese Navy's ability to impair American plans. The losses, speak for themselves. 10,500 Japanese dead, with the loss of 1 fleet carrier, 3 light carriers, 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and over 500 planes. In terms of dead the battle was the American navy's most costly up to that point. 3,000 sailors were lost, with American ship losses coming in at 1 light carrier, 2 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, and about 200 planes lost. Nimitz would no longer factor the IJN's movements and intentions into his plans.
The Crew of the Zuikaku Salutes as the Flag is Lowered
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Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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The Great Retreat
The devastation of the Japanese fleet left the high command in a daze. In the Philippines the Japanese tried to carry out things as if nothing had happened, running supplies to Leyte. The destruction of one such convoy at Ormoc Bay proved that such operations were impossible. Meanwhile, the base at Manila was pounded from the air and several damaged ships were sunk. After some delay, Toyoda decided to order most of the fleet from oil-rich Burnei back to Japan, keeping some forces to protect Singapore from Britain's growing naval strength. Still, American aircraft and submarines took a frightful toll, the most famous victim being the battleship Kongo, torpedoed in a squall and lost off Formosa.
In spite of Ormoc Bay, Toyoda decided to use the fleet to run supplies to the Philippines. Plans to ferry aircraft through the carriers were only abandoned when submarines claimed the carriers Shinyo and Shinano. Unryu was sent with a cargo of new experimental rocket-kamikazes called Ohkas, but she too fell victim to a submarine attack. What was left of the convoy made for Manila where the destroyers Momi and Hinoki were each sunk in the last surface battles fought between America and Japan. With the loss of Unryu and the damaging of the carrier Junyo, Toyoda at last bowed to reality. His fleet was effectively blockaded by submarines.
Still, in the Southwest Pacific the war raged on, as most of Japan's heavy cruisers took up residence at Singapore. The ships were in a deplorable state, and soon came under submarine and air attack. On May 15-16, 1945 in the last surface battle of World War II, Haguro was sunk by five British destroyers in Malacca Strait. On June 8, 1945, Ashigara was lost trying to ferry troops to Singapore. Things were no better off the coast of Japan.
Haguro
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18.
Board Game: Kamikaze
[Average Rating:5.95 Unranked]
Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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Kamikaze
Leyte Gulf had broken the navy's back, but it also gave the Japanese a desperation weapon: the kamikaze. Even before Leyte Gulf there had been discussion of such tactics, with Rear Admiral Masafumi Arima sacrificing himself days before the battle. However, it was under Vice Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi that the tactics were tried in mass during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Not everyone approved of these tactics, and Genda continued to train his pilots in a standard fashion. Soon the American navy was employing their own defensive tactics, including the expanded use of British Spitfire fighters. Although the attacks managed to inflict heavy losses off Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the American military still conquered these islands and now launched air raids and shore bombardments of the mainland. Still, some 2,800 Kamikazes sank 47 ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. It was arguably the most costly and bitter struggle in the American navy's long history.
The most tragic of all kamikaze attacks came when the powerful battleship Yamato was sent out with a large escort. The goal was to draw American aircraft away from Okinawa, and if possible have Yamato beach itself on Okinawa. The operation was denounced by many. Seiichi Ito, Nagano's former second in command who was chosen to lead the attack, actually refused to give the order to set sail. The hare-brained scheme failed. Yamato was swamped by Allied aircraft and sank after an hours long struggle, taking thousands of men with her. Ito dutifully sank with his ship. Toyoda's popularity, never high, plummeted. He was given Nagano's old job, formerly held by the unremarkable Koshiro Oikawa. Toyoda was promoted because Admiral Yonai, the Prime Minister, thought Toyoda would agree with his peace plans. Instead, along with Generals Korechika Anami and Yoshijiro Umezu, he supported a fight to the death "strategy." So Toyoda, known for opposition to the war and hatred of the army, now seemed out of his mind.
Toyoda's successor in fleet command was Ozawa, who soon had no ships to command. His vessels were mostly based at Kure and being used as floating anti-aircraft batteries. Nimitz meanwhile had decided to destroy what was left of the fleet, ostensibly to prevent it from stopping the Soviet Navy, which was soon to join the war. Halsey, eager to avenge Pearl Harbor, gleefully ordered a reluctant John McCain I to send his carrier planes in two massed attacks on July 24 and 28. Although losses were heavy, the Americans sank the carriers Amagi and Kaiyo along with the battleships Hyuga, Haruna, and Ise, as well as three cruisers. For the Imperial Japanese Navy it was the final curtain. For America it was the last declaration of their dominance, with a kind of bloody poetic justice. In a perverse kind of irony, the last two ships lost in the Pacific War were American. They were the destroyer Callaghan, the last kamikaze victim, and the cruiser Indianapolis, which was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine.
High School Girls Cheer the Kamikazes
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19.
Board Game: IJN
[Average Rating:6.27 Unranked]
Sean Chick
United States
Hammond
Louisiana
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Owari - The End
Even though America had dropped two nuclear bombs and the USSR had overrun the Japanese Army in Manchuria, Toyoda still believed in fighting to the death. It hardly mattered. Peace came, and with it many suicides. Admirals Ōnishi and Ugaki, commanders of the kamikazes, both choose death, with Ugaki making a kamikaze attack. No representative from the IJN was present to surrender in Tokyo Bay. Only the broken down Nagato, Japan's last battleship, was in Tokyo Bay that morning. It had been Yamamoto's headquarters when Pearl Harbor was attacked, and now it witnessed the final act. On July 1, 1946 she was lost in the infamous Bikini Atomic tests. By then there was no longer an Imperial Japanese Navy.
One of history's most powerful fleets was wiped out in just under four years. It was as much a testament to American prowess and industry, as it was to modern weapons that could unleash a destruction only dreamed of by de Ruyter, Jean Bart, and Nelson. Yet the IJN was the main author of its own destruction. They accepted a war they could hardly win, while being married to rigid strategic thinking and planning. Even cautious American admirals, such as Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher, showed more flexibility than their Japanese counterparts. It is with good reason that the IJN is remembered as a force of breathtaking brilliance and incompetence, brave and cruel, and ultimately doomed. Like the French in the eighteenth century, Japan had an impressive fleet with many accomplishments. However, she challenged the most powerful navy ever assembled, just as the French were doomed to battle the Royal Navy at its height. Both may have avoided these struggles. However, with such a powerful instrument at their beck and call, the leaders could not help themselves and in the end both navies supported war.
Does the Imperial Japanese Navy have a legacy? In a purely ironic sense, America as we know it today is the product of the navy, for the attack on Pearl Harbor angered America, which in turn created a powerful military to avenge that humiliation. On the more aesthetic level there are board games and video games, scattered films and television shows, each giving a vague impression of power. Yet not a single ship survives. They are all lost, and each day the veteran sailors and pilots perish. All that is left are the sunken ships that dot the Pacific. On shallow atolls, they are explored by divers. Yet so many remain uncharted. Of the 19 aircraft carriers lost at sea, only part of the Kaga has ever been found. Only the Yamato, first found in 1982, has drawn the attention of deep sea explorers. The ship remains fixed in Japanese culture, despite its utter failure in wartime. The other wrecks remain scattered and undiscovered on the abyssal plain of the wide Pacific Ocean, slowly rotting away into nothing.
The Bow of the Yamato
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Posted Wed Feb 1, 2012 2:44 am
