GeekGold Bonus for All Supporters at year's end: 1000!
9,383 Supporters
$15 min for supporter badge & GeekGold bonus
17 Days Left

Support:

Recommend
10 
 Thumb up
 Hide
24 Posts

Wargames» Forums » General

Subject: Soviet tank tactics book and a question. rss

Your Tags: Add tags
Popular Tags: [View All]
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
I just found a really interesting publication, "Soviet Tank Company Tactics." It's a reprint of (I think) a DOD publication from 1976. The University of Michigan is reprinting a number of works, and I got it on Amazon for $11.82. It has great info for gamers if you want to try and play the Soviet company or battalion according to their doctrine.

It is a little surprising how "the Soviet planning in the 70's relied on tanks sticking close together, massing their fire on one target at a time, and limited radio contact. My sense is that not much had changed since 1945.

However, does anyone know if the Soviets used the same basic tactics in late-WWII?
3 
 Thumb up
0.01
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Roger Hobden
Canada
Montreal
Quebec
flag msg tools
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
Ordered !

Thanks for the heads up !

 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Jack
United States
Georgia
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
Here's a link to that manual and several others from the same time period-

SteelBeasts.com

Most of these are public, with no need to register or login.
5 
 Thumb up
1.00
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
Thanks for the info.
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Joe Donnelly
Canada
Unspecified
BC
flag msg tools
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
I did my tank troop leader training in the '70s, and except for the occasional "Sagger drill", I don't think we had changed much from 1945 either!
1 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Bill Eldard
United States
Burke
Virginia
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
Sunray11 wrote:
I did my tank troop leader training in the '70s, and except for the occasional "Sagger drill", I don't think we had changed much from 1945 either!


The biggest change in US tank tactics probably came with several developments beginning in the '70s and continuing through the '90s:

- night vision devices and other low visibility sensors (i.e. IR)

- gun stabilizers permitting tanks to fire effectively while moving cross country

- improved optics and laser ranging/targeting

- long-range smooth-bore cannon

- improved armor protection and more powerful engines

- common operating picture (COP)

But I'm speculating. I was never a tanker.
1 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Roger Hobden
Canada
Montreal
Quebec
flag msg tools
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
jackolantern wrote:
Here's a link to that manual and several others from the same time period-

SteelBeasts.com

Most of these are public, with no need to register or login.


Wow !

Thank you very much !
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
One thing I found interesting is that most Soviet tank radios were used for "receive only," and the crew was to transmit only in emergency. A company (12 -15 tanks if I recall) moved rapidly, made short halts, and the entire company would fire at a target designated by the company commander. The idea seemed to be that each target would be overwhelmed in turn by the firepower of the entire force. Apparently, the tank commanders had some discretion to shift fire for ATGM launches.

I somehow envisioned the mass of Soviet tanks moving forward and blasting at everything in sight.
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Brent Pollock
Canada
Saskatoon
Saskatchewan
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
TAHGC's MBT runs Soviet tank doctrine this way.
3 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Roger Hobden
Canada
Montreal
Quebec
flag msg tools
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
WBRP wrote:
TAHGC's MBT runs Soviet tank doctrine this way.

Luckily, the GMT reprint of this games has just reached it's P500 goal a few days ago. ninja
3 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
Mallet wrote:
WBRP wrote:
TAHGC's MBT runs Soviet tank doctrine this way.

Luckily, the GMT reprint of this games has just reached it's P500 goal a few days ago. ninja


Yep, I went in on it and both expansions.
2 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Kev.
United States
Austin
Texas
flag msg tools
Read & Watch at www.bigboardgaming.com
Avatar
mwindsor wrote:
Mallet wrote:
WBRP wrote:
TAHGC's MBT runs Soviet tank doctrine this way.

Luckily, the GMT reprint of this games has just reached it's P500 goal a few days ago. ninja


Yep, I went in on it and both expansions.

Full of win.
I am all in.
2 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Martin McCleary
United States
Huachuca City
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
There is a book, a reprint, of the Soviet tank doctrine from individual to company level, it is a direct translation of their 1944 manual.

As you go into this discussion you have to keep some things in mind:

First of all single net radio approaches are not difficult to employ and are not the disadvantage many in the West believe them to be. It requires discipline but it is very workable. I have done it, it works.

Secondly massing of fires on a single target reflects low PH/PK and generally poor gunnery (in other words they did the mathematical analysis and decided what the best approach was given known limitations), it also reflects the doctrinal directive to insure that the targeted tank is in fact destroyed. The Germans employed a similar approach - by the book - they shot the same target till it burned.

The Russians did not, unlike the Germans, have a systematic approach to tank gunnery training and so particularly earlier in the war individual tank gunnery was pretty poor in most but not all cases. Those who survived the initial engagements and went on to master their tanks fire control systems did Ok.

This approach to tank gunnery did not change thru the Cold War, only in recent years are they starting to address this as a systemic training deficiency. Current Russian systems are very good. In the hands of trained crews with quality ammunition there will be a big surprise in store for anyone who under estimates them.

Soviet tanks, WWII and Cold War, were good systems but often paired with very poorly trained crews hence the miserable reputation.

The doctrine the Soviets carried forth into the Cold War was honed and refined from direct WWII experience. It was very good doctrine and was quite workable given their particular approach to war.

Soviet doctrine doesn't really stress slavish adherence and makes / made plenty of allowance for initiative and flexibility however leader, staff, and soldier training deficiencies in many cases precluded the effective employment of that doctrine and equipment during WWII and this carried over to some degree in the Cold War.

Small units were expected to perform certain basic tasks and given real world training (time, ammo, individual quality, etc.) constraints in wartime they had a simplified approach. It wasn't elegant but it worked.

7 
 Thumb up
0.01
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Jason Cawley
United States
Anthem
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
Mike - Russian tank company was 10 vehicles, in WWII and throughout the cold war. 1 command tank and 3 platoons of 3 tanks each. The only exception was in the WWII era for some heavy tanks (KVs in 1941-2 had 2 tank platoons e.g.). Western tank companies were larger, 14 to as many as 22, using platoons of 4-5 vehicles and companies of 4 platoons in the case of Germany mediums (only).

As for why they moved and fired together, yes the idea of joint firing is to protect the rest of the formation by taking out any enemy that can see them, rapidly. They move together to ensure they have the same LOS and reverse LOS; that is, that enemies can't position themselves to see just one or two and duel that one, with the rest of the formation being able to reply right away. Others did the same with their platoons (occasionally just pairs), but the Russians wanted to be a step size larger to have numbers on such an enemy platoon.

Incidentally, that had nothing to do with any lack of accuracy. They just wanted an enemy 4-5 tank platoon to be outnumbered by replying fire even if that platoon got in the first salvo and got kills with that salvo.
2 
 Thumb up
0.01
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Martin McCleary
United States
Huachuca City
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
This is an extract from the 1976 Defense Intelligence Report on Soviet Tank Company Tactics. While this particular example is from a defensive scenario it points to the types of calculations the Russians made with regard to combat. This particular example deals with older systems like the T-55 and T-62. Consider that from a tank gunnery perspective these are engagements from a stationary tank vs a moving (closing) target at 1500m and closing. Accuracy calculations figure highly in these kinds of discussions.

“5. TANK FIRE FROM PREPARED POSITIONS. A
tank company firing from prepared positions is expected to open fire at l50O meters and achieve a 50 percent kill ratio. The Soviets consider that enemy tanks will attack at an average of 15 km/hour. They
estimate that each Soviet tank in the company will
be able to fire l0 to 12 rounds during an enemy attack.
Each Soviet tank is therefore credited with a potential
of five or six tank kills. It is projected by the Soviets
that a tank company after 30 percent losses can
still theoretically counter an attack by 30 to 40 enemy
tanks. Although such mathematics are optimistic they
are typical of the Soviet attitude to tactical questions.”

This is a Cold War example prior to the introduction of much more effective laser ranging systems, fully stabilized firing platforms, etc. In an offensive situation these numbers would go down pretty dramatically and as the study points out in another section much of the accuracy would depend on gunner skill. So, imagine a WWII scenario where you have a very junior fairly poorly trained platoon leader and subordinate crews - do you really think accuracy doesn't count? Numbers can make up for it to some degree and that's why you would mass fire; you can't just dismiss it as a factor.

As far as formation sizes my comment is that it tended to be driven more by the ability to effectively C2 a given size element given a leader with a limited amount of training. Pre WWII Soviet tank formations were often larger than 3 tank platoons / 10 tank company sized units. Once the war started things got smaller across the board - for a variety of reasons.
2 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Jason Cawley
United States
Anthem
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb

Martin - sorry, it is much simpler than that.

Russian doctrine throughout is to beat an enemy unit with a comparable unit up a step in size. It needs enough to do that, it doesn't need more, to fulfill its role in their overall doctrine.

3 tank platoons are meant to kill single enemy vehicles.
10 tank companies are meant to kill enemy platoons of 4-5 vehicles.
30 tank battalions are meant to kill enemy companies of 14 to 17 vehicles.

And so forth...

Incidentally, the first law of operations research is that the average deployed weapon system never accounts for its own equivalent KOed in the enemy force, over its entire operational life. Only above average weapon system even reach parity. Anyone reasoning that each weapon of type X will take out 5 enemy weapons of type X per engagement is just being stupid (or spreading propaganda to encourage confidence in his force, perhaps).

Derivation of the first law...

All fielded forces contribute to the destruction of enemy forces.
The winning side has some intact force at the end of the war.
Total losses to both sides are fielded by A plus fielded by B minus survive whole war (S for "survived", for short).
Total systems inflicting the losses are field by A plus fielded by B.
Average losses inflicted per system are total losses divided by total systems inflicting those losses.
Since S is greater than zero, the numerator of that fraction is less than its denominator.
Ergo the ratio itself is less than 1.

As was to be demonstrated...
1 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
On defense in prepared positions, which the Soviets saw only as a temporary expedient during offensive operations, Soviet tanks were expected to open fire at 1,500 meters and achieve a 50% kill ratio with the 10-12 rounds each tank is expected to fire in that time. A Soviet tank company after 30% losses (10-14 tanks in a company) should be able to counter 30-40 enemy tanks. That's from A.E. Hemesley's publication, "Soviet Tank Company Tactics" I cited earlier. That seems incredibly high, and I wonder what US tanks would anticipate as their kill ratio when in prepared position?

An interesting note is that the Hemesley publication concerned the T-62 and T-54/55. There is a note at the end about a photo seen in the Soviet technical press about a tank prototype the US was designating as the 7-72. This is Cold War at its best reading what the US was speculating based on the photo. When I looked up the T-72 on Wikipedia (I know), the T-72 was seen as having performed well against the M60 in the Golan, with T-72 few or no losses attributable to Israeli tank fire. Of course, the US upgraded to the M1A1, but it made me rethink the Soviet kill ratio estimates.

One thing the Hemesley publication stresses is that Soviet doctrine stresses constant, high tempo battles. Tanks fire on the move or in short halts. Tanks move fast to create or exploit gaps. Soviet tank companies will also try to flank an enemy position when possible. This means they have to have numbers on offense. It is also clear that, while they are trying to disrupt the enemy front with deep penetrations, they can become isolated, out of supply, and vulnerable if the enemy front is stable. I recall reading that in WWII, Soviets lost large units whose penetrations were not supported.
1 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Martin McCleary
United States
Huachuca City
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
JasonC wrote:

Martin - sorry, it is much simpler than that.

Russian doctrine throughout is to beat an enemy unit with a comparable unit up a step in size. It needs enough to do that, it doesn't need more, to fulfill its role in their overall doctrine.

3 tank platoons are meant to kill single enemy vehicles.
10 tank companies are meant to kill enemy platoons of 4-5 vehicles.
30 tank battalions are meant to kill enemy companies of 14 to 17 vehicles.

And so forth...

Incidentally, the first law of operations research is that the average deployed weapon system never accounts for its own equivalent KOed in the enemy force, over its entire operational life. Only above average weapon system even reach parity. Anyone reasoning that each weapon of type X will take out 5 enemy weapons of type X per engagement is just being stupid (or spreading propaganda to encourage confidence in his force, perhaps).

Derivation of the first law...

All fielded forces contribute to the destruction of enemy forces.
The winning side has some intact force at the end of the war.
Total losses to both sides are fielded by A plus fielded by B minus survive whole war (S for "survived", for short).
Total systems inflicting the losses are field by A plus fielded by B.
Average losses inflicted per system are total losses divided by total systems inflicting those losses.
Since S is greater than zero, the numerator of that fraction is less than its denominator.
Ergo the ratio itself is less than 1.

As was to be demonstrated...


Jason all I can say is that you haven't proven a single statement you've made so far it's all just your opinion. I've been into this topic for a long time and I have yet to see anything that even remotely suggests the things you claim.

It's an established fact that the Soviets / Russians were heavily into calculating combat norms and tried to apply them heavily. Their older doctrinal pubs are chock full of tables and calculations.

As far as the ORSA stuff - that's nice but irrelevant.

Finally, stop talking down to me in your replies. I'm not some 15 year old who just read my first history book.

1 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Martin McCleary
United States
Huachuca City
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
mwindsor wrote:
On defense in prepared positions, which the Soviets saw only as a temporary expedient during offensive operations, Soviet tanks were expected to open fire at 1,500 meters and achieve a 50% kill ratio with the 10-12 rounds each tank is expected to fire in that time. A Soviet tank company after 30% losses (10-14 tanks in a company) should be able to counter 30-40 enemy tanks. That's from A.E. Hemesley's publication, "Soviet Tank Company Tactics" I cited earlier. That seems incredibly high, and I wonder what US tanks would anticipate as their kill ratio when in prepared position?

An interesting note is that the Hemesley publication concerned the T-62 and T-54/55. There is a note at the end about a photo seen in the Soviet technical press about a tank prototype the US was designating as the 7-72. This is Cold War at its best reading what the US was speculating based on the photo. When I looked up the T-72 on Wikipedia (I know), the T-72 was seen as having performed well against the M60 in the Golan, with T-72 few or no losses attributable to Israeli tank fire. Of course, the US upgraded to the M1A1, but it made me rethink the Soviet kill ratio estimates.

One thing the Hemesley publication stresses is that Soviet doctrine stresses constant, high tempo battles. Tanks fire on the move or in short halts. Tanks move fast to create or exploit gaps. Soviet tank companies will also try to flank an enemy position when possible. This means they have to have numbers on offense. It is also clear that, while they are trying to disrupt the enemy front with deep penetrations, they can become isolated, out of supply, and vulnerable if the enemy front is stable. I recall reading that in WWII, Soviets lost large units whose penetrations were not supported.


In the 80's when we were doing heavy operations at places like the Army's National Training Center our prepared defensive positions were fairly well dug in and we were usually able - assuming dedicated "blade time" to at least get the tanks dug in to hull defilade. Our planning for target servicing was around the 1500 meter mark and you built the kill zone in from there dependent on what other weapon systems you had. The rule of thumb was that a company was expected to kill a Bn, so a Bn was expected to kill a Regt and so on.

A company team was usually hit by a reinforced MRB - so about 30 BMP's and 10 tanks plus supporting arty which was generally pretty devastating - now this varied tremendously for a variety of reasons so I'm not claiming it was an absolute - but the typical result was the company team was either destroyed in place or the trail back to their subsequent fighting positions was littered with dead vehicles.

In some cases if they did a good job with their obstacles and used the terrain really well they'd shoot the MRB up pretty well and there were many occasions when only a few vehicles survived but if the defense was compromised that was all that was needed.

I did this many times from both sides over the years. For a U.S. style defense to be effective it required really skilled and well planned defensive work and all the various parts had to come together - arty, engineers, ADA, direct fire, etc. The tank crews had to absolutely know what they were doing, in some cases they did, in most they were just "average".

Now this is all in a training environment but I think it was fairly indicative of what we'd be up against - the tactical lessons were valid. The OPFOR we fought against was really well honed, I suspect the GSFG in reality was not so well trained and led.

The key to any Soviet/Russian attack is a combination of effective arty and tempo. If you read closely you realize that the arty is the main contributor to achieving effective suppression to allow the attacking force to get on and do the close work.

I've got PDF's of the original work Hemesley is citing for the various echelons.

The notes you make about the 72 at the back - yes but the thing we generally didn't talk about much was that as the later models of the T-72 were introduced (B, BV, etc.) it became clear that our 105 wasn't up to task - hence the reason during Desert Storm we swapped out all the 105 armed M1's for M1A1 series. The T-72 has been thru many variations over the decades.

Anyway lots of variables in the equation which is what always makes it fun from a gaming perspective.

It's interesting the impact the 73 war made on the U.S. Army. I have the consolidated Dupuy papers in PDF from that period and if you can find them it makes fascinating reading on the state of our army at the time and what changes were instituted.

6 
 Thumb up
0.25
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Mike Windsor
United States
Fort Worth
Texas
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
Thanks Martin. I have no military experience, and I've found that in my games, I tend to move both side's tanks willy-nilly with mixed results. Hence my desire to learn some of the basic doctrine of each side and try to play the sides according to their doctrine.

From a game design standpoint, some games tend to award the same victory points for lost vehicles. It seems clear, however, that the Soviets on the offensive expect to take more losses than their enemies.
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Martin McCleary
United States
Huachuca City
Arizona
flag msg tools
mbmbmbmbmb
mwindsor wrote:
Thanks Martin. I have no military experience, and I've found that in my games, I tend to move both side's tanks willy-nilly with mixed results. Hence my desire to learn some of the basic doctrine of each side and try to play the sides according to their doctrine.

From a game design standpoint, some games tend to award the same victory points for lost vehicles. It seems clear, however, that the Soviets on the offensive expect to take more losses than their enemies.


Truth is in reality you see that particular effect a lot - there tends to be a lack of tactical patience and units get rushed typically by higher HQ pressing for results. I saw this a lot in my National Training Center days - it was always go go go and the lead company's of a battalion task force attack would get jammed into the OPFOR kill sacks. It also seems to happen when you read historical accounts.

I've often felt that many games tend to use the limited turns to achieve the same effect - intentionally or not. From a game standpoint I'd usually argue that most squad / platoon level games don't allocate enough time (game turns) to do the job right.

It would be an interesting study to compare the actual time real world historical operations were conducted in against game turn allocations. My personal feeling is that they are often out of sync but that's just a gut level feeling, nothing analytical.

Going back to your original question I was re reading some stuff last night and I think it's safe to say that during WWII the Soviets developed a basic doctrine and by end of war had refined it into an effective approach to the offense and defense. Post war efforts refined it even further in technique and complexity. I think they had a good doctrine in the Cold War but the issue was always whether they had conducted the necessary training to actually implement it effectively. We'll never really know.

There is an excellent book called T-34 in action by Drabkin & Sheremet. It's a series of interviews with Russian tankers post WWII. One of the sections I was reading again last night was the interview with a guy who rose from platoon leader to battalion commander by the end of the war. That section alone is worth the price of the book (at least to me).

Feel free to PM me if you want to carry on the discussion. I also have some PDF's of some other Cold War manuals I'm happy to share.

Take care,

Martin
3 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Kev.
United States
Austin
Texas
flag msg tools
Read & Watch at www.bigboardgaming.com
Avatar
Rallye72 wrote:
mwindsor wrote:
On defense in prepared positions, which the Soviets saw only as a temporary expedient during offensive operations, Soviet tanks were expected to open fire at 1,500 meters and achieve a 50% kill ratio with the 10-12 rounds each tank is expected to fire in that time. A Soviet tank company after 30% losses (10-14 tanks in a company) should be able to counter 30-40 enemy tanks. That's from A.E. Hemesley's publication, "Soviet Tank Company Tactics" I cited earlier. That seems incredibly high, and I wonder what US tanks would anticipate as their kill ratio when in prepared position?

An interesting note is that the Hemesley publication concerned the T-62 and T-54/55. There is a note at the end about a photo seen in the Soviet technical press about a tank prototype the US was designating as the 7-72. This is Cold War at its best reading what the US was speculating based on the photo. When I looked up the T-72 on Wikipedia (I know), the T-72 was seen as having performed well against the M60 in the Golan, with T-72 few or no losses attributable to Israeli tank fire. Of course, the US upgraded to the M1A1, but it made me rethink the Soviet kill ratio estimates.

One thing the Hemesley publication stresses is that Soviet doctrine stresses constant, high tempo battles. Tanks fire on the move or in short halts. Tanks move fast to create or exploit gaps. Soviet tank companies will also try to flank an enemy position when possible. This means they have to have numbers on offense. It is also clear that, while they are trying to disrupt the enemy front with deep penetrations, they can become isolated, out of supply, and vulnerable if the enemy front is stable. I recall reading that in WWII, Soviets lost large units whose penetrations were not supported.


In the 80's when we were doing heavy operations at places like the Army's National Training Center our prepared defensive positions were fairly well dug in and we were usually able - assuming dedicated "blade time" to at least get the tanks dug in to hull defilade. Our planning for target servicing was around the 1500 meter mark and you built the kill zone in from there dependent on what other weapon systems you had. The rule of thumb was that a company was expected to kill a Bn, so a Bn was expected to kill a Regt and so on.

A company team was usually hit by a reinforced MRB - so about 30 BMP's and 10 tanks plus supporting arty which was generally pretty devastating - now this varied tremendously for a variety of reasons so I'm not claiming it was an absolute - but the typical result was the company team was either destroyed in place or the trail back to their subsequent fighting positions was littered with dead vehicles.

In some cases if they did a good job with their obstacles and used the terrain really well they'd shoot the MRB up pretty well and there were many occasions when only a few vehicles survived but if the defense was compromised that was all that was needed.

I did this many times from both sides over the years. For a U.S. style defense to be effective it required really skilled and well planned defensive work and all the various parts had to come together - arty, engineers, ADA, direct fire, etc. The tank crews had to absolutely know what they were doing, in some cases they did, in most they were just "average".

Now this is all in a training environment but I think it was fairly indicative of what we'd be up against - the tactical lessons were valid. The OPFOR we fought against was really well honed, I suspect the GSFG in reality was not so well trained and led.

The key to any Soviet/Russian attack is a combination of effective arty and tempo. If you read closely you realize that the arty is the main contributor to achieving effective suppression to allow the attacking force to get on and do the close work.

I've got PDF's of the original work Hemesley is citing for the various echelons.

The notes you make about the 72 at the back - yes but the thing we generally didn't talk about much was that as the later models of the T-72 were introduced (B, BV, etc.) it became clear that our 105 wasn't up to task - hence the reason during Desert Storm we swapped out all the 105 armed M1's for M1A1 series. The T-72 has been thru many variations over the decades.

Anyway lots of variables in the equation which is what always makes it fun from a gaming perspective.

It's interesting the impact the 73 war made on the U.S. Army. I have the consolidated Dupuy papers in PDF from that period and if you can find them it makes fascinating reading on the state of our army at the time and what changes were instituted.


Interesting reading! Is Dupuy something you can d.load via Amazon or .mil site?
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Jack
United States
Georgia
flag msg tools
badge
Avatar
mbmbmbmbmb
This may be a portion of the Dupuy papers mentioned-

Selected Papers of General William Depuy (BIG pdf-490 pages)

or this-

General William E. DePuy Preparing the Army for Modern War
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Kev.
United States
Austin
Texas
flag msg tools
Read & Watch at www.bigboardgaming.com
Avatar
Thanks.
 
 Thumb up
 tip
 Hide
  • [+] Dice rolls
Front Page | Welcome | Contact | Privacy Policy | Terms of Service | Advertise | Support BGG | Feeds RSS
Geekdo, BoardGameGeek, the Geekdo logo, and the BoardGameGeek logo are trademarks of BoardGameGeek, LLC.