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Subject: It is no wonder that Lee lost at Gettysburg. rss

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Steve
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I've been watching the U-Tube videos of the Ranger talks at the Gettysburg Battlefield Park.

I noticed in the attacks on the Peach Orchard & Wheatfield, on Cemetery Hill (in evening of 2nd day), and Pickets Charge, all 3 attacks had no follow up force. No reserve to add to the fight to sway the outcome. The Union sent reinforcements and the south didn't so the Union won all 3 fights.

At Cemetery Hill it is particularly strange. Lee sent 1 Brigade to attack after dark a Div. size force on a Hill. This is how the Ranger made it sound at least. The Brig. made it past the Inf. on the slope all the way to the guns on the crest, but the Union counterattacking Inf. drove them off.
. . I have fiddled with changing the old AH Gettysburg game and I noticed that the town of Gettysburg actually made the Hill stronger because the southern troops could not attack the Hill through the town. The town split any assault on the hill into 2 parts. It was much harder to coordinate the 2 parts into 1 assault instead of 2 separate ones at 2 times.

At the Peach Orchard, the Union forces were driven back to Cemetery Ridge, but the Union didn't want to defend the ground in front of it anyway. So, I can say that the South won the fight but it didn't win anything as a result. As far as I know Anderson's fresh Div. had not moved in behind McLaws Div. to reinforce the assault. It is amazing it got as far as it did given the level of Union response. If Anderson's Div. had followed behind McLaws Div. the attack might have taken Cemetery Ridge.

It is possible that the supports for Pickets Charge were ordered not to advance. That is, they were there ready to go but it was decided that they were not enough to win so Picket and the other Div. were left "swinging in the wind" so to speak. All their bravery was to no avail because their supports were held back. Or, there never was a plan to support the attack.

Can we agree that in the Civil War it was necessary to send in a 2nd major wave to support the 1st wave if you wanted to take and hold some terrain objective?

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Pete Belli
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Quote:
I noticed that the town of Gettysburg actually made the Hill stronger because the southern troops could not attack the Hill through the town. The town split any assault on the hill into 2 parts.


Historically accurate.

City streets and Civil War tactics did not mix.
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David G. Cox Esq.
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Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.
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Steve1501 wrote:

Can we agree that in the Civil War it was necessary to send in a 2nd major wave to support the 1st wave if you wanted to take and hold some terrain objective?



... or even a 3rd or 4th wave.
And even then you may not be able to hold the ground.

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da pyrate wrote:
Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.

Are you agreeing with me specifically that a 2nd wave was necessary?

 
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Steve1501 wrote:
da pyrate wrote:
Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.

Are you agreeing with me specifically that a 2nd wave was necessary?



If he hoped to hold it a second wave would be necessary.


He should have walked away. Gettysburg had little strategic significance. There was no real need to fight, especially as it involved attacking uphill against an enemy with interior lines.

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da pyrate wrote:
Steve1501 wrote:
da pyrate wrote:
Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.

Are you agreeing with me specifically that a 2nd wave was necessary?



If he hoped to hold it a second wave would be necessary.


He should have walked away. Gettysburg had little strategic significance. There was no real need to fight, especially as it involved attacking uphill against an enemy with interior lines.

shake

With the benefit of hindsight, do historians generally agree with Longstreet's position on Gettysburg, that a charge for the hill was too costly for the very small odds of success?
 
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Carl Fung
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The attack on the Union left flank attack on Day 2 was Longstreet's attack. Anderson's Division was part of Hill's Corps. While Anderson was committed lightly, the coordination and late jump off made a coordinated attack iffy. This is different than Day 3's Pickett's Charge which had Divisions from Hill's and Longstreet's Corps, but Longstreet was technically in overall command. The reason for the hodge podge and relevant to this discussion is that most of Lee's forces were spent and the only fresh/recouped forces were the three committed and even at that the other two divisions lost face and didn't commit fully. So goes the fog of war.

Basically, Lee had no reserves. His 9 divisions were on the offensive against a larger army with interior lines. A 2nd wave would've been great but where would he have been able to get them from? Rodes' division? That would've been the only option as McLaw's and Hood were spend and needed to watch the Union left. Ewell was tied up (much to his own fault) at Culp's Hill and through Gettysburg.

Even if Lee had conjured up a reserve to hold the center gains, Meade had all of the 6th Corps, fresh, in reserve and much of 1st and 11th Corps recuperating that could have thrown in for good measure.

Steve1501 wrote:

Can we agree that in the Civil War it was necessary to send in a 2nd major wave to support the 1st wave if you wanted to take and hold some terrain objective?


That's true for any war but commanders are not always afforded the luxury of having what they need. Lee gambled. He came REALLY close to winning but lost.
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These issues have been discussed for decades, and still make for great discussion. One of the reasons Gettysburg remains such a fascinating battle.

Despite the controversies surrounding Longstreet's flank march and the late step-off, I think Lee's best chance was still the July 2 afternoon assault. Indeed, the delay might have helped Lee because it gave Sickles the opportunity to occupy his vulnerable salient encompassing the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard (an act which itself opens up endless discussion).

Maybe because he was short reserves (although some claim Pickett's division could have reached the field on July 2 if it had been ordered up), Lee's plan called for an echelon attack from right to left, starting with Longstreet's two divisions (Hood, then McLaws). While these two divisions didn't seize all their objectives, they did heavy damage and forced Meade to shift significant forces to his left, leaving his center vulnerable.

This is where Lee's attack broke down. Anderson's division (next after McLaws) was committed haphazardly, and Pender's division was never committed after its dynamic young commander was wounded (a stroke of bad luck Lee later said cost him the battle).

As Carl points out these two divisions were part of AP Hill's Corps. So Hill probably deserves much of the blame for the July 2 plan's failure, although he was a new Corps commander and possibly incapacitated due to illness. Ultimately, the responsibility lies with Lee. I wonder why he didn't simply detach Hill's Corps to Longstreet's command (as he would do on July 3, when the battle was already lost IMO). Maybe because he and Longstreet had argued about the plan and Lee didn't feel comfortable putting more responsibility on his most trusted subordinate. Of course, Lee himself wasn't in the best health at Gettysburg. So many questions!
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"We made a great mistake, Mr. Hill, in the beginning of our struggle, and I fear, in spite of all we can do, it will prove to be a fatal mistake," he said to me, after General Bragg ceased to command the Army of Tennessee, an event Lee deplored.

"What mistake is that, general?"

"Why, sir, in the beginning we appointed all our worst generals to command the armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers. As you know, I have planned some campaigns and quite a number of battles. I have given the work all the care and thought I could, and sometimes, when my plans were completed, as far as I could see, they seemed to be perfect. But when I have fought them through, I have discovered defects and occasionally wondered I did not see some of the defects in advance. When it was all over, I found by reading a newspaper that these best editor generals saw all the defects plainly from the start. Unfortunately, they did not communicate their knowledge to me until it was too late." Then, after a pause, he added, with a beautiful, grave expression I can never forget: "I have no ambition but to serve the Confederacy, and do all I can to win our independence. I an willing to serve in any capacity to which the authorities may assign me. I have done the best I could in the field, and have not succeeded as I could wish. I am willing to yield my place to these best generals, and I will do my best for the cause in editing a newspaper."

In the same strain he once remarked to one of his generals: "Even as poor a soldier as I am can generally discover mistakes after it is all over. But if I could only induce these wise gentlemen who see them so clearly beforehand to communicate with me in advance, instead of waiting until the evil has come upon us, to let me know that they knew all the time, it would be far better for my reputation, and (what is of more consequence) far better for the cause."
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Lee had developed his own command style after serving on the staff of Winfield Scott in the Mexican War. As an army commander Scott was a headquarters operator who relied on the discretion of his subordinates. With a few notable exceptions, Robert E. Lee allowed his corps and division commanders to fulfill the objectives described in his battle plan as they saw fit.

"I do everything in my power to make my plans as perfect as possible, and to bring the troops upon the field of battle; the rest must be done by my generals and their troops, trusting to Providence for the victory."

Robert E. Lee
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    Lee's primary strategic responsibility was to maintain his army in the field, and to maintain it as a threat. He had no reason to fight at Gettysburg at all.

    But he did. Everything is easy in hindsight.

             S.

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pete belli wrote:
Lee had developed his own command style after serving on the staff of Winfield Scott in the Mexican War. As an army commander Scott was a headquarters operator who relied on the discretion of his subordinates. With a few notable exceptions, Robert E. Lee allowed his corps and division commanders to fulfill the objectives described in his battle plan as they saw fit.

"I do everything in my power to make my plans as perfect as possible, and to bring the troops upon the field of battle; the rest must be done by my generals and their troops, trusting to Providence for the victory."

Robert E. Lee


Or for those lazy folks who just watched the movie:


"God's will"
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There is the problem of Stuart's missing cavalry forces on Day 1. Lee was deprived of his best cavalry, and as a result, he was not getting the intel he needed to formulate an accurate picture of the battlefield or the size of the Union forces facing him at Gettysburg.

Regarding Picket's Charge, remember that the two sides fought an artillery duel earlier that day. During the exchange of fire, the Union artillerists decided to stop firing to conserve ammo. Lee believed that his artillery had won the duel and ordered Picket to charge the center of the Union line. A woeful and costly mistake, realized only after Picket's men were devastated and his entire unit utterly destroyed.

The rest, as they say, is history.
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calvinboy24 wrote:
Even if Lee had conjured up a reserve to hold the center gains, Meade had all of the 6th Corps, fresh, in reserve and much of 1st and 11th Corps recuperating that could have thrown in for good measure.

Bingo. Sedgwick had the largest Union corps and saw little to no action at Gettysburg.


calvinboy24 wrote:
That's true for any war but commanders are not always afforded the luxury of having what they need. Lee gambled. He came REALLY close to winning but lost.

I think he was close to winning on the first day, before the whole Union Army came up, but not so much on the others...and I don't think a decisive victory was likely in any case, especially after day one. On the other two days, even had Longstreet's Assault or Pickett's Charge provided a significant breakthrough, Sedgwick's Corps could've been called to either counterattack or to cover an orderly retreat to Meade's preferred defensive line at Pipe Creek...
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Notwithstanding Lee (or his subordinates, if he wished to deny responsibility) made several errors during the battle, his biggest error was fighting the battle in the first place - against a numerically superior enemy in a great defensive position. He thought the Yankees would run at the sound of a rebel yell & he was wrong.

Regards
Keith
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Steve1501 wrote:
Can we agree that in the Civil War it was necessary to send in a 2nd major wave to support the 1st wave if you wanted to take and hold some terrain objective?

I've got to find that YouTube Ranger talk. Sounds fascinating, thanks for the tip!

I think we, as horrendously amateur historian/generals, still understand that it really doesn't matter what war you're talking about -- you need reserves to either exploit success or minimize failure. Great analysis by the way. Well done.

As someone else pointed out, Lee's biggest failure was to even fight the battle. In the Civil War, the defense had the advantage, a fairly substantial one. Lee should have listened to Longstreet. The Army of Virginia should have slid off to the east, threatening Meade's line of communication and forcing Meade to attack Lee on ground of Lee's choosing. Instead, he let himself be drawn piecemeal into a battle neither side really planned for.

Lee has a well-deserved reputation as a general, but when he had to go on the offense, he was pedestrian at best. I would have to say Longstreet and Sheridan were probably better at the offense than most Civil War generals. But it's often forgotten that there were two battles where a Confederate army was shattered and routed from the field -- Chattanooga and Nashville. In both instances, George Thomas -- more known for his deliberation and defensive prowess -- commanded the troops that smashed the Confederate armies.

Great discussion. Way too much of a Civil War junkie to pass it up!
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Great discussion!

I think Lee's reputation adds to the mystique of Gettysburg - people will endlessly analyse the decisions made during the battle, looking at key moments when the ANV could have won because most of us can't understand why on earth he chose to attack a much large force on better ground. Lee made a mistake - and to those of us reflecting on his choices, with the weight of the reputation given him by history, that's quite hard to accept.
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da pyrate wrote:
Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.

I wonder if this and Lee's failure to follow up assaults with another wave was a result of the few attacks that Lee had made in the previous 2 years.

And attacks on the flank of a force [Chancelorsville] and on a beaten force don't count because they will give way easily. It is stubborn defenders that require the 2nd wave.

I also wonder if this is another example of what many have observed.

1] The stupid can't learn from their own mistakes [at all].
2] Those with average smarts don't learn after making the same mistake once or twice, but do learn after 3 or 4 times.
3] The smart learn more quickly from their own mistakes.
4] But nobody [except the truly wise and truly intelligent] can learn by watching the mistakes of others.

Lee had beaten back Union assaults for 2 years. He had seen how hard it was to attack and hold ground and yet he had not learned something that was taught at West Point [I assume because it is widely true through time], namely the need for a reserve and that timing its commitment is the key to winning battles. That he who had and committed the last reserve force usually won the battle.

Waterloo is perhaps an exception in that the Old Guard was the last reserve sent in by either side and its attack failed.

Lee's previous experiences with attacking included his 1st experiences 2+ years before, the Seven Days Battles where the Union gave way easily. Maybe Lee drew the wrong conclusion from this. The Union didn't retreat because they had to, they retreated because McClellan was faint of heart and the fight was on southern soil. Did Lee think that a fight on northern soil with Meade in command would be the same? If so, he was being stupid because he knew Meade wasn't faint of heart.

 
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Steve
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Before you-all read this you might be better to skip down 1 reply to the one I wrote about Jenkins' Brig. and how little it did.

calvinboy24 wrote:
The attack on the Union left flank attack on Day 2 was Longstreet's attack. Anderson's Division was part of Hill's Corps. While Anderson was committed lightly, the coordination and late jump off made a coordinated attack iffy. This is different than Day 3's Pickett's Charge which had Divisions from Hill's and Longstreet's Corps, but Longstreet was technically in overall command. The reason for the hodge podge and relevant to this discussion is that most of Lee's forces were spent and the only fresh/recouped forces were the three committed and even at that the other two divisions lost face and didn't commit fully. So goes the fog of war.

As I understand it, this attack was to be made as a series of attacks, starting on the far left with Hood's Div., then McLaws Div., then Anderson's Div. if things were going well. But, Anderson was to attack new Union troops to the left of the ones McLaws was fighting.

calvinboy24 wrote:
Basically, Lee had no reserves. His 9 divisions were on the offensive against a larger army with interior lines. A 2nd wave would've been great but where would he have been able to get them from? Rodes' division? That would've been the only option as McLaw's and Hood were spend and needed to watch the Union left. Ewell was tied up (much to his own fault) at Culp's Hill and through Gettysburg.

We all know that Lee won the 1st day's fight with 4 Div. [Heth, Rhodes, Pender, and Early]. That afternoon and evening 4 more arrived. Johnson was properly sent to the right to help Ewell take Culps Hill. Hood and McLaws were sent to the left to attack there. Anderson was kept in the center to cover Heth and Pender as they rested and reformed.
. . . This is the critical mistake of the 2nd day. Anderson should have been attached to Longstreet and used as the 2nd wave as I said. Heth and Pender should have covered the center. They had no more right to rest and reform as did Rhodes and Early did, they were required to stay in the line and support Johnson at Culps Hill and then assault Cemetery Hill.

calvinboy24 wrote:
Even if Lee had conjured up a reserve to hold the center gains, Meade had all of the 6th Corps, fresh, in reserve and much of 1st and 11th Corps recuperating that could have thrown in for good measure.

Yes, it seems unlikely that Lee could have won no matter what. He should have moved away after the 1st day. Perhaps this is a more critical mistake on the 2nd day.
. . . The question then becomes where else could Lee have gone to help the South win the war?
. . . 1] The one thing that Lee knows that he MUST AVOID was to let himself be surrounded by trenches as Pemberton had done at Vicksburg.
. . . . . a] So, he should not swing around the east flank of the battle and move toward Phillidelphia. That way there are large rivers that Lee can't cross and that make it easy for the Union to surround him with trenches.
. . . . . b] So, should he do as Longstreet suggested and swing around the west flank of the battle? I doubt that Meade would assault Lee wherever he dug himself in. Meade wasn't that stupid. All he would have to do is either move to cut Lee's retreat route or try to surround him with trenches. This will cause Lee to either attack or retreat back into Virginia.
. . . 2] Or should Lee have sat there at Gettysburg and hope Meade would assault him there? He would have to be careful to avoid being cut off from his retreat route. And Meade doesn't need to assault him.
. . . 3] This leaves the 3rd option for Lee, to fall back away rom the AotP by going north and spreading out again. The idea was to live off the farms of Penn. for a while. Why not do that some while longer?
. . . . . a] If Lee spreads the ANV out will Meade spread the AotP out also or will he keep it concentrated? If he spreads it out then Lee can try to concentrate on a part of it again. If Meade keeps it concentrated then Lee can move faster and live off the land.
. . . . . b] Meade would be trying for his part to force Lee to fight or run back to Virginia. Those are his orders -- to cover Washington and force Lee out of Penn. Hooker had tried to get permission to fortify the line of the Potomac River to keep the ANV from getting back to Virginia. He had been let go and replaced with Meade. Hooker's plan was better if the Union can let Lee live in Penn. for a while. It would have shortened the war. But, what nation can let an enemy army hold a part of its heartland like that?
. . . . . c] Lee didn't know that Meade could not move to cut him off from Virginia without either letting Lee rampage around in Penn. or expose Washington to an attack by Lee. If he had known then what should he have done after the 1st day?

. . Personally, I think Lincoln was totally wrong. Let Lee attack Washington, but follow close behind him. This would force Lee to not attack and since we are further down stream the Potomac would be unfordable. It should be easy for Meade to surround Lee in the field and force him to surrender just like Pemberton is about to be forced to do.

calvinboy24 wrote:
Steve1501 wrote:

Can we agree that in the Civil War it was necessary to send in a 2nd major wave to support the 1st wave if you wanted to take and hold some terrain objective?


That's true for any war but commanders are not always afforded the luxury of having what they need. Lee gambled. He came REALLY close to winning but lost.

I disagree that Lee came close to winning. As you said just above Meade had the VI Corps and the I C that he could have sent into the fight. In fact Meade made an error in not sending Buford''s Cav. Div. [and maybe an Inf. Corps too (I C?)] during Pickett's Charge to cut the Emmittsbutg Road and Lee's easiest route back to Virginia. He didn't need them to win the battle and cutting the road would have been sweet.

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Cantatta wrote:
There is the problem of Stuart's missing cavalry forces on Day 1. Lee was deprived of his best cavalry, and as a result, he was not getting the intel he needed to formulate an accurate picture of the battlefield or the size of the Union forces facing him at Gettysburg.

Regarding Picket's Charge, remember that the two sides fought an artillery duel earlier that day. During the exchange of fire, the Union artillerists decided to stop firing to conserve ammo. Lee believed that his artillery had won the duel and ordered Picket to charge the center of the Union line. A woeful and costly mistake, realized only after Picket's men were devastated and his entire unit utterly destroyed.

The rest, as they say, is history.

Perhaps a critical mistake that has not gotten any attention was made in the planning stage. Ewell's advance into Penn. was led by a Brig. of mounted men. Jenkin's Brig. maybe should not be called "Cavalry". It seems to have been made up of irregulars. It seems to have arrived on the battlefield with Ewell, but did very little. It didn't even cover the left flank of the Army. That is Cav.'s job, but Early had to detach 1/3 of his Div. [the smallest in the ANV] to watch the Roads from the east because of reports of Union troops approaching. Junkin's Brig. didn't fill in for Stuart's missing Cav. in any other way either. It apparently sent no reports to Lee about the Union Army.
. . . What if Jones' Brig. had been sent with Ewell into Penn. instead of Jenkins? What if his Brig. had arrived with Ewell? Would this have made any difference?


 
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Desiderata wrote:
da pyrate wrote:
Steve1501 wrote:
da pyrate wrote:
Lee had a bad day...three days actually...it happens to many of us.

In hindsight, Lee had many wasted opportunities at Gettysburg.

Are you agreeing with me specifically that a 2nd wave was necessary?



If he hoped to hold it a second wave would be necessary.


He should have walked away. Gettysburg had little strategic significance. There was no real need to fight, especially as it involved attacking uphill against an enemy with interior lines.

shake

With the benefit of hindsight, do historians generally agree with Longstreet's position on Gettysburg, that a charge for the hill was too costly for the very small odds of success?


If by "a charge for the hill was too costly for very small odds of success" you're talking about Little Round Top on July 2, in a nutshell, yes. That said, LRT was not Longstreet's goal on July 2 (or July 3, for that matter). On 7/2, it was to roll up the Federal left flank because the Confederates labored under the misconception that the Union left flank sat hanging somewhere along Cemetery Ridge north of the Round Tops. Faulty intel fed into that misconception. For the South, Anderson did not fully comply by not assuring that his division was ready to continue what Longstreet started. Posey got hung up at the Bliss Farm and Mahone refused to move his brigade. And that was after Wright achieved a fleeting breakthrough that was stymied by the 1st Minnesota's countercharge.

For Longstreet's part, his troops did about as well as could expected considering that reinforcements were not available. They inflicted better than 2,000 more casualties than they sustained. That was helped by Sickles foolish move into the Peach Orchard.
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keithrose wrote:
Notwithstanding Lee (or his subordinates, if he wished to deny responsibility) made several errors during the battle, his biggest error was fighting the battle in the first place - against a numerically superior enemy in a great defensive position. He thought the Yankees would run at the sound of a rebel yell & he was wrong.

Regards
Keith


Of course, though, on the first day the Yankees only had two thirds of Buford's cavalry division on the field. It was a race against time to get adequate Federal forces onto the field to stall the Confederates' first day attacks. By the end of the first day's fighting, it was highly unlikely that Ewell's Corps would be able to capture either Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill without support from Anderson's fresh division or at least arty support to provide counterbattery fire against Cemetery Hill. Rodes' division was pretty well chopped up. And Early's was split between rounding up prisoners in town or watching the left flank against either a real or perceived threat to their left flank. Johnson's division wouldn't (couldn't) reach the field till 7 pm at the earliest because of traffic jams on the Chambersburg Pike.
 
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TDMD wrote:
keithrose wrote:
Notwithstanding Lee (or his subordinates, if he wished to deny responsibility) made several errors during the battle, his biggest error was fighting the battle in the first place - against a numerically superior enemy in a great defensive position. He thought the Yankees would run at the sound of a rebel yell & he was wrong.

Regards
Keith


Of course, though, on the first day the Yankees only had two thirds of Buford's cavalry division on the field. It was a race against time to get adequate Federal forces onto the field to stall the Confederates' first day attacks. By the end of the first day's fighting, it was highly unlikely that Ewell's Corps would be able to capture either Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill without support from Anderson's fresh division or at least arty support to provide counterbattery fire against Cemetery Hill. Rodes' division was pretty well chopped up. And Early's was split between rounding up prisoners in town or watching the left flank against either a real or perceived threat to their left flank. Johnson's division wouldn't (couldn't) reach the field till 7 pm at the earliest because of traffic jams on the Chambersburg Pike.

IIRC, the order of units marching down the road were: 1] IIC supply trains, 2] II C Res. Art., 3] Johnson's Div., and finally 4] Anderson's Div. So, Anderson would arrive after Johnson.

You also somehow forgot to mention the Union I & XI Corps which fought on the 1st day.

For those of you who are reading this thread in the future, I was shown that I was wrong and Anderson did arrive at about 4:30PM, at our map edge. So, 5PM or later by the time he could have marched into the town. He was kept in reserve by Lee. Should Lee have used the fresh Div. to assault Cemetery Hill?

 
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Steve1501 wrote:
TDMD wrote:
keithrose wrote:
Notwithstanding Lee (or his subordinates, if he wished to deny responsibility) made several errors during the battle, his biggest error was fighting the battle in the first place - against a numerically superior enemy in a great defensive position. He thought the Yankees would run at the sound of a rebel yell & he was wrong.

Regards
Keith


Of course, though, on the first day the Yankees only had two thirds of Buford's cavalry division on the field. It was a race against time to get adequate Federal forces onto the field to stall the Confederates' first day attacks. By the end of the first day's fighting, it was highly unlikely that Ewell's Corps would be able to capture either Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill without support from Anderson's fresh division or at least arty support to provide counterbattery fire against Cemetery Hill. Rodes' division was pretty well chopped up. And Early's was split between rounding up prisoners in town or watching the left flank against either a real or perceived threat to their left flank. Johnson's division wouldn't (couldn't) reach the field till 7 pm at the earliest because of traffic jams on the Chambersburg Pike.

IIRC, the order of units marching down the road were: 1] IIC supply trains, 2] II C Res. Art., 3] Johnson's Div., and finally 4] Anderson's Div. So, Anderson would arrive after Johnson.

You also somehow forgot to mention the Union I & XI Corps which fought on the 1st day.



Nope, Johnson's men didn't make the field till 7; I'm thinking Anderson got there about 4 pm - 4:45. In fact, I believe that it's mentioned in the Confederate ORs that Lee intended for Anderson's division to be the ANV's reserve force. Also, Thomas' brigade of Pender's division was also untouched by the day's fighting. Ewell couldn't even get from the fresh brigade, let alone Anderson's division.

I didn't forget the First and Eleventh Corps. By mentioning that it was a race against time that adequate Federal troops would arrive on the field in time and then stating that by the end of the day Ewell's men couldn't take the heights without support I thought would indicate that fresh troops had arrived. And yes, to be precise, it was the First and Eleventh Corps.
 
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